Interviewed by Lasantha Wickrematunge, The Sunday Leader
Published on 6 February 2005
Q. Mr. Balasingham what was the purpose of your visit to Sri Lanka this time?
A. I was invited by Mr. Pirapaharan to attend the critical meeting with the Norwegian peace envoys including the Norwegian Foreign Affairs Minister and the Minister for International Development. The Norwegians were on a mission to assess the damage caused to the Tamil populated areas. We gave them a total picture of the damage to areas in the north eastern region, particularly the coastal areas under the LTTE. We also gave them a needs assessment book formulated by our planning and development secretariat. Other than that I have been visiting areas affected by the tsunami – particularly Mullaithivu and Vadamaarachchi East. I was deeply shocked and distressed by the nature of the destruction. I don’t want to go into the details of this because it has already been well covered by the world media itself.
Q. There is a dialogue going on between the government and the LTTE. At what level is this dialogue taking place?
A. It is at a low level between the peace secretariats of Kilinochchi and Colombo. Between Dhanapala and Puleethevan heading both institutions. And these talks are primarily confined to the disbursement of the relief assistance from the donor community, aimed at working out a joint mechanism at a regional level to distribute the aid to the affected people on an equitable basis. So there have been six or seven rounds of discussions – yesterday and today also they had discussions – discussions being held confidentially and there are about six or seven sessions that have taken place already.
And what I can say is because of the confidentiality pledged between both the parties I cannot reveal the essence or the content of the discussions – but I can say this much, both the parties have been pressurised by the international community particularly the co-chairs and other countries to work out as quickly as possible a kind of a regional mechanism agreeable to both parties so that there will not be any bureaucratic hurdles or any other difficulties in chanelling the funds to the affected people.
Of course the LTTE wants to play a crucial role in the mechanism, particularly for the north east. There are various presidential task forces and this and that. That is on a national basis, but our real concern is to formulate a regional structure so that the LTTE plays a significant role and to see that the aid, relief assistance reach the people without any bureaucratic and other hurdles. But so far both the parties have not succeeded in formulating an acceptable structure because I think from my discussions with Puleethevan and others I can say that the President wants to give the state machinery primacy with regard to the allocation and disbursement of funds.
As you know there are elements within the government itself which are totally opposed to any form of agreement with the LTTE with regard to the formulation of a joint structure, particularly the JVP and also some elements of the SLFP. But regardless the talks are going on, so I cannot give a definitive response saying that the talks have failed or not. Still no breakthrough though.
Q. So there is still no breakthrough?
A. There is no breakthrough and still there are hurdles and difficulties in formulating an acceptable mechanism and still the talks are going on. So we have been advised, because these talks are being mediated by the Norwegians. I can’t even say where they are taking place, but then you already know.
Q. Now the LTTE gave a proposal which was published in the newspapers originally, asking for a three member apex body and to appoint various district coordinators for each district. Has the government rejected that proposal?
A. Originally the government came out with a set of proposals, then the LTTE responded with a set of proposals on three levels – national, regional and district levels. At the national level the LTTE proposed that the national body should consist of representatives from the Muslim, Sinhala and Tamil communities. They have also suggested a mechanism for a regional body and already a district level task force is functioning, which involves GAs, international NGOs, civil society, LTTE, etc. So that is not a problem. The real problem is with the regional structure. Because it is within the regional structure that the LTTE wants to have a dominant say.
In the composition of the regional body the government is not still happy about the fact that the LTTE should have the majority. Apart from that there are so many other problems. You know the government wants to involve all the state structures, including the treasury, the various ministries, the provincial councils – so they have this conglomerations of defunct bureaucracies.
What we want is a very simple mechanism where the government and the LTTE can coordinate and this is not a political or ethnic issue – this is simply an issue where you are dealing with foreign assistance to be distributed equitably based on the principle of accountability, transparency and so forth. That is what our concern is – not that we want to dominate the whole thing – rather to ensure that this global response to our calamity is adequately addressed.
Q. Would you say that the gap between the government and the LTTE in arriving at this mechanism has widened or is static from the time the talks started?
A. It is a very difficult question because I wouldn’t say it like that. What I will say is that both the parties are making genuine attempts to work out a mechanism acceptable to the three communities who are directly involved in this calamity. The problem is even though there is a genuine attempt by both parties, politics of ethnicity also play a role. Say for example, the Tamil people expect the government should make some goodwill gestures and to do something constructive at this critical stage when all the communities in that particular region are affected by a common calamity. But when you realise certain things – like the UN Secretary General debarred from visiting…
Q. How much has the government decision to prevent Kofi Annan from visiting the LTTE controlled areas to get a first hand look at the humanitarian disaster, affected relations between the parties?
A. I think it was a serious historical blunder that the government has made because if the Secretary General was to visit Mullaithivu in the LTTE controlled area, it would have had a very positive impact on the peace process itself and also the government could have impressed upon the international community that it had transcended the politics of ethnicity in this humanitarian disaster and would have given the Tamil people tremendous confidence that the government is genuine. It would have created a positive, constructive environment for the resumption of peace talks at a later stage, once this humanitarian problem is resolved. So by preventing the Secretary General from visiting LTTE controlled areas, the Tamil people feel that still the government is operating on the basis of their historical animosity – racial animosity – and that they have not gone beyond the politics of discrimination. Because when the government talks of one nation and one people, it is talking about the fact that a natural calamity has struck without any ethnic differentiation or religions for that matter.
But it all comes to nothing when you prevent someone from visiting because what I genuinely feel as a negotiator is that this is a golden opportunity for the Sinhala ruling class to create congenial conditions so that now there is no question of war or terrorism – everything is gone. So this is the ideal time to embrace this grieved community and to allow some of the leaders to visit. Of course we are not expecting other government officials to go there. But the UN Secretary General is a leader representing an entire nation of people – whether it is a state or non-state actors there is no difference, we are talking about people.
Q. Apart from the Secretary General’s visit, did the state media propaganda, backed up by the Navy Commander, Daya Sandagiri that LTTE Leader Velupillai Pirapaharan as well Head of Intelligence Pottu Amman were killed have an impact on the LTTE’s approach to the government and with regard to the government’s bona fides?
A. Yes, because this distorted propaganda does have an effect on the thinking of the leadership. We feel that the entire Sinhala media is prejudiced and this is a manifestation of a deep seated desire to see that Pirapaharan, Pottu Amman and all the LTTE leaders perished. But that won’t help – there are two realities – Pirapaharan exists as the leader of the Tamil people and there is an administration run by the LTTE in the north east. And these are realities, whichever government may be in power.
Why we admire Ranil Wickremesinghe is because he recognised the authenticity of the situation, the ground reality of the situation and desired to enter into a negotiating process with the leadership of the Tamil people on an equal basis as partners in the peace process. That approach is still absent in the present government. Even though the LTTE having – as you can see Pirapaharan’s Martyr’s Day speech – he said that we have no other alternative but to resume our freedom struggle because we have come to the end of our tether, to the brink of toleration, and there is no hope.
So it was at that juncture when the natural calamity struck. And it has awakened the entire country to the fact that – look this is a deep seated problem the whole country is devastated, forget about the ethnic problem, politics and everything and try to work together. And if we can work together on the tsunami situation it would create an ideal environment for both parties to resume talks.
Q. How much of an impact will the JVP’s position that the LTTE should not have a role to play in that process impact on an agreement given the fact that the JVP can determine the future of this government?
A. JVP is the cardinal factor for the current stalemate in the peace process and the JVP is going to be the factor that will have a far reaching negative impact on the whole process. I would say that if the government continues to embrace the JVP and to run this government, I can assure you definitely there won’t be any scope for peace talks, or the peace process or a peaceful negotiated settlement. Because the JVP is taking a very hard-line, belligerent attitude towards the Tamil people. You can’t just blame the LTTE and say that we are for the Tamil people but we hate the LTTE – that is out of the question because the LTTE represents the Tamil people. Acceptance of the LTTE as a dominant force in the politics of the north and east is something that has to happen and the JVP is going to turn out to be a disaster for the government in the future.
Q. The President herself soon after the tsunami said that the LTTE as a military force has been finished and that they are not in a position to wage war – that was the focus that was presented to the country soon after she returned from London. How serious is the damage inflicted to the LTTE’s military might and can the government work on the assumption that the LTTE is militarily weakened and that it is now negotiating from a position of weakness?
A. No, I wouldn’t say that because I have been there and met all the senior military commanders. I spent several days with Soosai, the naval commander and visited all the naval bases on the Tamil Eelam coast. What I can say is this, to be very honest with you, there is no serious damage in terms of casualties. Of course some of our naval bases have been damaged and some of our boats have been destroyed, there is no doubt about it. But in terms of casualties, it is very very minimal. I don’t want to say how many, but I would say minimal. Because all our armed forces are confined to military bases in the jungle areas. Only the naval unit was confined to the coastal regions.
I think D.B. S. Jeyaraj is correct when he says in his article that all the ship building and all the naval gunboats are always inside because we know from experience in the last 10 years that if you keep your naval gunboats along the coastal belt there are two dangers – one by aerial bombardment and by naval bombardment you can destroy our boats because you have a powerful navy. So what we do is we bring the boats from inside our secret bases – we pull them inside by various means, we don’t have massive ships only small gunboats. So we bring them, put them into action after that they are withdrawn to their bases. Only few boats here and there were affected.
Q. So you would say that it is wrong to assume that the LTTE has been militarily weakened?
A. No, it has not been weakened at all.
Q. But would you say that the prospect of the ceasefire breaking down has receded now because of the tsunami?
A. The tsunami has a humanitarian factor, a human factor that prevents both the parties from undertaking any military operations. After this monumental tragedy, both the parties are obliged to look into the interests of the affected people. Hundreds of thousands of people are affected, millions are displaced and neither party now can ignore this phenomenon and look into the problem of waging a war or building up a military machine.
Q. The government has already undertaken procurement, the army commander has been sent to Iran, the navy is purchasing various equipment. Does this mean that the LTTE will also then counter this by purchasing military hardware themselves?
A. We have decided to give primacy to humanitarian relief work for the time being. We have mobilised the entire military and naval units; our social economic organisations like TRO and all these things and we are involved in a massive rehabilitation effort which many people have seen. Secondly, we are also deeply distressed over the fact that the Sri Lankan government at this tragic situation sent people to purchase arms from Iran and other places. We know that. We know there is a military build up on the Sinhala side. But as far as we are concerned, we cannot and we don’t have the resources to build up our military machine at this stage and it is immoral on the part of anybody to ignore the suffering masses and spend a huge amount of money in helping the militarisation process.
Q . In the event that the government and LTTE fail to reach an agreement on this mechanism to handle the tsunami relief assistance for the north east, do you think the country as a whole, from the feedback you are getting, be deprived of development assistance?
A. Of course. The entire international community and particularly the donor community expects both parties in conflict should transcend the politics of ethnicity and work together and coordinate to evolve a joint mechanism for the welfare of the affected people. That is the expectation of the world. If we fail, the international community will definitely lose faith in the government and the LTTE and it will definitely affect the flow of development aid to the entire country. Secondly I would say that as a government and a state, which has obligations to its citizens, has a moral duty to ensure that they should work along with the rebel movement and to compromise to some extent and to embrace them in the path of national reconstruction.
Q. Given the fact that the UNP has also asked the government and the donor community to work directly with the people affected including in the north and east, why in your view is the government reluctant to do so when they would have a clear majority in parliament with the support of the UNP and other parties other than the JVP?
A. I don’t want to comment on that.
Q. With all these tsunami issues holding centre stage, does it mean that the LTTE has decided to put the peace process and its call for the ISGA in the backburner?
A. No, what we are suggesting is that if the ISGA was adopted and implemented this problem would not arise. Secondly we are not throwing the ISGA or the ethnic problem aside. What we are saying is that this is an immediate urgent tragedy that has to be attended to because the enormity of the suffering is such that we have to sometimes transcend the politics of ethnicity and to work something out. With all that, we want to have an interim set up – a coordinated mechanism so that we could play a dominant role in the administration of this relief assistance to disburse the relief aid equitably among our people. There is an element of politics there in our discussions also, but that does not mean this is the politics of resolving the ethnic problem but rather resolving the immediate humanitarian problem.
Q. What you’re looking at is a mechanism for the entire north and east, not only the areas controlled by the LTTE. Is that correct?
A. Involving the other communities, including the Sinhala and Muslim communities also to give them an adequate role in the allocation and disbursement of aid.
Q. Is the LTTE prepared to work in a set up where the government is the dominant force in the north east?
A. No. We want to coordinate with the government administration. Already we are doing this with the government agents and other officials at different district levels. But we don’t want a dominant role by the state to channel this aid and we want to have a critical say in the disbursement.
Q. Are you talking with the Muslim leadership as well to formulate this mechanism?
A. No. What is happening is that both the parties are talking about how the Muslim people can be effectively represented. When we reach the final stages of course we will consult the Muslim parties and see whether these proposals are acceptable to them. Of course we will listen to their opinion also, but at a later stage.